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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION
In most professional team sport leagues in Europe the institutional environment 
has changed from time to time in a response to changes in product and/or labor mar-
ket conditions. While these changes have been described in a number of monographs1 
and their impact upon teams has been analyzed in a number of detailed case studies, 
their inﬂ  uence on (the careers of) individual players remains largely unexplored. This 
is surprising insofar as most of the changes that have occurred over the last three or 
four decades are likely to affect the players much more than either the teams or the 
consumers. Thus, the aim of our paper is to conduct an econometric analysis of the 
(changing) dy namics of the market for professional soccer players in Germany, covering 
the period 1963/64 (when the German “Bundesliga” was established) until 2002/03. 
While individuals who have made it into one of the North American major leagues 
are threatened by upcoming youngsters only, the relegation system that is being used 
across all Western European team sports leagues has an additional threat to the teams’ 
athletes:2 being on the roster of one of the poorly performing teams may mean that a 
talented and successful player has to leave the league without a reasonable chance 
to return. Moreover, it is quite likely that especially the more recent changes in the 
institutional environment, such as the Bosman-ruling [see, inter alia, Simmons, 1997; 
Antonioni and Cubbin, 2000] had the effect of reducing the length of individual careers 
because poorly performing players can now be replaced more easily by (cheap) labor 
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There are a number of other changes that may have had an impact on players’ careers:
• In  the  ﬁ  rst two seasons (1963/64 and 1964/65) the number of clubs was lim-
ited to 16. Before the season 1965/66, the number was increased to 18. In the season 
1991/92 the number was further increased to 20 to integrate a number of teams from 
the former East German Oberliga. After that season, however, the number of teams 
was again reduced to 18. 
•  In 1968/69 the number of players that could be substituted during a match was 
increased from one to two. Since 1995/96 three players may be replaced. Substitutes may 
either serve the purpose of replacing an injured player or may have tactical reasons. 
•  In order to punish players for behaving “unfairly” by tackling opposing players 
too hard, referees may sanction players by showing them a yellow card ﬁ  rst and, in case 
the player repeats his unfair actions, a red card. In the latter case, a player is sent off 
the ﬁ  eld with no substitution being allowed. Red and yellow cards were implemented 
in 1970/71 and in 1991/92 a combined yellow/red card was introduced. Following a 
red card a player is—depending on the severity of the foul committed—barred from 
competition for 3-6 weeks while a yellow/red card implies that a player is excluded 
for one match. Moreover, if a player has accumulated ﬁ  ve yellow cards, he is also 
excluded from the next match.
•  In order to promote offensive play the league in 1995/96 considerably increased 
the rewards for winning. While until then the winning team received two points (the 
losing team zero, in case of a tie both teams were and still are awarded one point), 
winning is now rewarded with three points, i.e., the “prize spread” between winner 
and loser was increased.
•  Finally, in a response to the so-called “Bosman-ruling” the league in 1996/97 
increased the number of foreign players allowed per team: Teams may now employ 
as many foreigners from UEFA countries as they wish and are additionally permitted 
to have three Non-UEFA players competing simultaneously on the pitch. This latter 
rule was changed again in 2001/02. Now the number of foreigners from Non-UEFA 
countries that may be used in a single match is ﬁ  ve.
Thus, the aim of our paper is to add to the growing body of literature trying to 
identify the relative importance of individual, team-speciﬁ  c and “environmental” 
factors in explaining the players’ individual labor market success, i.e., the longevity 
of their careers (for recent summaries of labor markets in professional team sports 
see Rosen and Sanderson [2001] as well as Kahn [2000]). Summarizing, then, the 
purpose of our paper is manifold, because the high quality data we have (it has been 
produced and is still being used by the league administration) enable us to address 
several different questions simultaneously:
•  First, is there any discrimination with regard to individual career duration? 
Have non-German players from different parts of the world a higher probability of 
being cut from the league? Have defensive players—often considered less valuable by 
managers and less supported by fans—shorter careers than midﬁ  elders or forwards?
•  Second, to what extent does the team’s success affect the career duration of 
its individual players? Is the risk of being cut especially pronounced for players who 
are active for teams that have been relegated?
•  Finally, do the numerous changes in the institutional environment have any 
pronounced effect on the individual player’s career duration?431 CAREER DURATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁ  rst one tackling the questions 
mentioned above for any of the professional team sports leagues in Europe. It takes 
up several of the questions that have been raised by, inter alia, Hoang and Rascher 
[1999] and Groothuis and Hill [2004], who studied exit discrimination of black players 
in the NBA, Ohkusa [2001], who studied the quit behavior of Japanese baseball play-
ers, Spurr and Barber [1994], who analyzed the careers and the success probabilities 
of minor league baseball players, and Atkinson and Tschirhart [1986], who looked at 
the determinants of career length in the NFL [see also Jiobu, 1988].
Using an individual data set that contains information on every single player who 
appeared in at least one match in the ﬁ  rst German soccer league (the “Bundesliga”) since 
it was established in 1963/64, we estimate failure time models that explain the length of 
what can be termed a rather risky career. Section 2 offers a description of the data set, 
section 3 ﬁ  rst introduces the estimation methods used and then presents our empirical 
ﬁ  ndings. We conclude with a summary and some implications for further research.
DATA SET AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Our empirical investigation is based on a longitudinal data set from the German 
Bundesliga covering a 40 year period. The dataset has been compiled from various 
issues of Kicker, a wellknown and widely read soccer magazine. Apart from informa-
tion on individual player characteristics the data set also includes some measures of 
team performance and of changes in the institutional environment.
The dataset consists of all players employed by any one of the 48 teams in any 
of the Bundesliga seasons 1963/64-2002/03. While the number of different players 
is 4,116, the number of different spells amounts to 5,354. This implies that quite a 
number of players exit the league at some point in time and then return after one or 
more seasons. The departing players either leave the league voluntarily by signing 
with a team abroad (in Italy, Spain, England or France for example) or involuntarily 
because their team is relegated. Summarizing, it appears that most players have 
rather short careers (see columns 3 and 5, Table 1).
More than one third of all players “disappear” again after their ﬁ  rst season and 
only one career out of twelve lasts for 10 years and more. The fact that very short 
spells are more frequent than very short careers (46% vs. 34%) is due to the fact that 
recently promoted teams have a high probability of being relegated again after just 
one season [Frick and Prinz 2004]. Thus, players who are under contract with one of 
the promoted teams are more likely than others to disappear again after their ﬁ  rst 
season.3 Since a number of teams have been oscillating between ﬁ  rst and second divi-
sion for years, many players manage to play ﬁ  rst division more than once, but very 
often for rather short periods of time.
Consequently, some players cannot be observed temporarily and are thus removed 
from the risk pool for the duration of their absence. In order to account for these temporary 
exits we use two different dependent variables in our empirical analysis: The term “spell 
duration” is used to describe a period that is not interrupted by a temporary exit and a 
subsequent reentry while the term “career duration” refers to the total number of years 
a player has been active in the Bun  des  liga. Thus, when analyzing the determinants of 
spell length we treat “re-entrants” as new players (see column 4, Table 2) while in the 
case of career length we treat them as “incumbents” (see column 5, Table 2).432 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  1
  Number of Players Appearing for ... Years in the Bundesliga, 
  1963/64 - 2002/03
Number  Spell Duration  Career Duration
of Years  n  %  n  %
1 2,463  46.00  1,414  34.35
2 1,033  19.29 756  18.37
3 543  10.14  452  10.98
4 346  6.46  333  8.09
5 225  4.20  230  5.59
6 170  3.18  187  4.54
7 132  2.47  161  3.91
8 102  1.91  126  3.06
9 74  1.38  111  2.70
10 77  1.44  86  2.09
11 49  0.92  66  1.60
12 45  0.84  61  1.48
13 26  0.49  31  0.75
14 36  0.67  41  1.00
15 16  0.30  26  0.63
16 9  0.17  15  0.36
17 4  0.07  13  0.32
18 3  0.06  3  0.07
19 1  0.02  3  0.07
22 0  0.00  1  0.02
 5,354  100  4,116  100
Table 2 illustrates this phenomenon by using one of the most prominent players 
in our database as an example: Lothar Matthäus played nine years for two different 
teams in the Bundesliga before he left Germany to sign with the Italian top team of 
Internazionale Milano. He returned to Bayern Mu  nich in 1993 which means that he 
was temporarily removed from our risk pool. Ignoring his stay in Italy we treat him as 
a new player in the season he returned to the Bundesliga. The career information of all 
players that exited and re-entered the league is organized in this manner, irrespective 
of whether they played for the same team before they left or for another club (see Model 
I, Table 5 below). However, when analyzing the determinants of career duration we 
use the aggregated number of years a player has spent in the league irrespective of the 
number and/or the duration of interruptions (see Models II and III, Table 5 below).
Comparing overall career duration and average spell length is interesting as 
the means are quite different (4 years vs. 3.4 years; see Table 3). Recall that career 
duration is deﬁ  ned as the total number of years an individual has been playing in 
the Bundesliga, ignoring exits and re-entries. Spell duration, on the other hand, only 
counts the years without any interruption. 
  Moreover, it appears from Table 3 that players are on average 26 years old and 
that they have spent 2.7 years with one and the same employer (not necessarily in the 
ﬁ  rst division only; players might have been active for their current team before that 
team was promoted). The average number of goals scored per season is 2.5, the aver-
age number of yellow cards is 1.7 and players are used for 20 matches per season.
MODELS AND RESULTS
In an attempt to analyze the impact player characteristics, player performance 
and institutional changes might have on the team's decision to retain or cut players we 433 CAREER DURATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
estimate three Cox proportional hazard models that differ in the dependent variables 
used (spell duration and two different measures of career duration).
 
 TABLE  2
  The Treatment of Player Re-entry in the Bundesliga
Name  Team  Season  Spell   Career Length  Number
     Length/Re-Entry  (temporary  exit  of  Spell
       ignored)
Matthäus Gladbach 1980  1  1  1454
Matthäus Gladbach 1981  2  2  1454
Matthäus Gladbach 1982  3  3  1454
Matthäus Gladbach 1983  4  4  1454
Matthäus Gladbach 1984  5  5  1454
Matthäus Munich 1985  6  6  1454
Matthäus Munich 1986  7  7  1454
Matthäus Munich 1987  8  8  1454
Matthäus Munich 1988  9  9  1454
Matthäus Munich 1993  1  10  1455
Matthäus Munich 1994  2  11  1455
Matthäus Munich 1995  3  12  1455
Matthäus Munich 1996  4  13  1455
Matthäus Munich 1997  5  14  1455
Matthäus Munich 1998  6  15  1455
Matthäus Munich 1999  7  16  1455
Matthäus Munich 2000  8  17  1455
 TABLE  3
 Summary  Statistics
++Spell Length  3.36  2.93  1  19  15,299
Career Length  3.96  3.32  1  22  15,299
Age (AGE)  26.52  4.07  17  44  15,299
Tenure (TEN)  2.67  2.32  1  19  15,299
Games Played per Season (GP)  19.93  10.94  1  38  15,299
Goals per Season (GS)  2.48  3.83  0  40  15,299
Red Cards per Season (RCA)  0.09  0.31  0  3  15,299
Yellow Cards per Season (YCA)  1.75  2.33  0  16  15,299
Goalkeeper (GK)  0.09  -  0  1  15,299
Defender (DEF)  0.32  -  0  1  15,299
Midﬁ  elder (MID)  0.31  -  0  1  15,299
Forward (FOR)  0.28  -  0  1  15,299
German (GER)  0.82  -  0  1  15,299
Eastern Europe (EEU)  0.05  -  0  1  15,299
Western Europe (WEU)  0.05  -  0  1  15,299
North America (NAM)  0.00  -  0  1  15,299
South America (SAM)  0.03  -  0  1  15,299
Asia (ASI)  0.01  -  0  1  15,299
Africa (AFR)  0.03  -  0  1  15,299
Australia (AUS)  0.01  -  0  1  15,299
Final League Position (POS)  9.67  5.18  1  20  15,299
League Size 16 (NC16)  0.04  -  0  1  15,299
League Size 18 (NC18)  0.93  -  0  1  15,299
League Size 20 (NC20)  0.03  -  0  1  15,299
3 Foreigners (FOR3)  0.21  -  0  1  15,299
No Restriction (FOR+)  0.11  -  0  1  15,299434 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Analyzing the effects of the covariates on the hazard function requires a dura-
tion model. This is the proportio  nal hazard approach which consists, however, of a 
wide array of different models. We decided to use Cox’s [1972] semi-parametric pro-
portional hazard model. The Cox model is a well recognized statistical technique for 
analyzing survival data. Moreover, it is the most general regression model developed 
to investigate survival data, because it does not impose any assumption concerning 
the nature or the shape of the underlying survival distribution. The model assumes 
that the underlying hazard rate (rather than the survival time) is a function of the 
independent variables. The Cox model does not limit the pattern of the hazard rate 
like parametric models with a Weibull, exponential or log-logistic distribution and it 
further solves the problem of censored observations [Kiefer, 1988]. In the Cox model 
the conditional hazard function, given the vector z of covariate values at time t or the 
corresponding time interval, is assumed to be of the following form:
  ) exp( ) ( ) | ( 0 z t z t β λ λ = ,
where β is the vector of regression coefﬁ  cients and λ0 (t) denotes the baseline hazard 
function. The baseline hazard function corresponds to the probability for the respective 
player of leaving the league either voluntarily or involuntarily (or generally reaching 
an event) when all the explanatory variables are zero. The baseline hazard function 
is analogous to the intercept in ordinary regressions (since exp(0) = 1). One additional 
feature of the model is that exogenous variables can be time-constant variables, but 
also—and more important—time-varying variables such as performance or age. 
The regression coefﬁ  cients  ˆ β (the covariates of interest) give the proportional 
change that can be expected in the hazard, related to changes in the independent 
variables. They are estimated by maximizing the partial log-likelihood function:
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where j indexes the ordered failure times tj, Dj is the set of dj observations that fail at 
tj, and Rj is the set of individuals that are at risk at time tj. Only event times (leaving 
the Bundesliga) contribute positively in the ﬁ  rst expression to the partial likelihood. 
In general, the hazard rate is the probability of being eliminated from the league 
during a speciﬁ  c time interval, conditional on having been in the league until the 
beginning of that interval.
Summarizing, the hazard concept has clear advantages compared to its potential 
alternative, a logistic regression. Estimating a logistic regression with a dummy as 
the dependent variable (distinguishing players that left the Bundesliga from those 
who survived) does not use all the information available for both groups. Moreover, it 
cannot incorporate the effect of a player’s duration in the state prior to the occurrence 
of the event. Finally, a logit regression cannot handle in a satisfactory way right-cen-
sored cases, i.e., the players for which the event of being ﬁ  red from the league is not 
observed within the time period of our analysis (t4 in our Figure 2 in the appendix).435 CAREER DURATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
At the same time, however, we also observe players whose spells are left-censored. 
These are the individuals who might have started their careers before the Bundesliga was 
established in 1963/64 (t5). Unfortunately, we are unable to distinguish between players 
who started their careers in 1963/64 and those who had already been active in one of 
the “Oberliga”, i.e., those who had already been playing as (semi-)prof  es  sionals before. 
However, estimating our model with and without the players with left-cen  sored spells 
leaves the ﬁ  ndings virtually unchanged. This is not surprising, since the overwhelming 
majority of the players begin and end their careers during the period of observation. 
Table 4 provides information on the number of cases available for our empirical 
analyses; Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix display the survival and the hazard rate 
for the population we study.
 TABLE  4
  The Size of the Player Population (1963/64-2002/03)
Number of Different Players:    4,116
Number of Different Spells:    5,354
Number of Failures:  3,662  /  4,900*
Incomplete Spells:         454
Number of Player-Year-Observations:  15,299
* The ﬁ  rst number is for individuals, the second for spells.
Table 5 shows the results of our estimations. The base models display a consider-
ably better ﬁ  t than the respective null model implying that the accumulated effect of 
the covariates on the probability of leaving the Bundes  li  ga is not signiﬁ  cant can be 
rejected at all conventional levels of signiﬁ  cance. Furthermore, the summary statistics 
indicate that in absolute terms 4,900 and 3,662 events were observed (players leaving 
the Bundesliga during the 40 year period under observation). Table 5 includes the 
results of various Cox models that differ in the dependent variables used. Model I 
seeks to identify the determinants of spell duration while Models II and III use career 
duration as the dependent variable (the difference between the latter two models is 
that we once include the years a player has presumably been active in either division 
2 or abroad (Model II) while in the other case we disregard these years (Model III). 
As expected, the three estimations produce quite similar results.4
Perhaps surprisingly, the available performance statistics have a purely linear 
impact on the duration of individual careers (none of the squared terms proved to be 
statistically signiﬁ  cant): While age has a statistically positive inﬂ  uence on the prob-
ability of being eliminated from the Bundesliga (i.e., the hazard ratio has a value of 
larger than one), the number of games played and the number of goals scored per 
season both have a statistically negative inﬂ  uence (i.e., the hazard ratio in both cases 
takes a value of less than one). Depending on the speciﬁ  cation, an additional year 
increases the dropout probability considerably (between 6% and 25%). Scoring one 
more goal per season reduces a player’s probability of being cut from the league by 
5-7%.5 Similarly, playing one more match per season compared to the average player 
reduces that probability by 5-6%. Moreover, sanctions in the form of yellow or red 
cards have no inﬂ  uence on the probability of being eliminated. 
As expected, all of the position dummies are signiﬁ  cant, indicating that defenders, 
midﬁ  elders and forwards have signiﬁ  cantly shorter spells and careers than goalkeepers 436 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
(the reference category). Perhaps surprisingly, defenders survive considerably longer 
than midﬁ  elders and especially forwards.6 
 TABLE  5
  Determinants of Spell and Career Duration in the Bundesliga, 
 1963/64-2002/03#
Variable  Spell Duration  Career Duration  Career Duration 
 (Model  I)    (Model II)  (Model III)
  Hazard z Hazard z  Hazard  z
  Ratio  Ratio   Ratio 
 Individual  Characteristics
AGE 1.103  (3.65)***  1.251  (7.07)***  1.063  (1.71)*
AGE2 0.999  (1.48)+  0.998  (3.92)***  1.000  (0.47)+
TEN 1.028  (1.20)+  0.962  (1.94)*  0.997  (0.09)+
TEN2 0.999  (0.68)+  1.004  (2.16)**  1.000  (0.12)+
GP 0.953  (11.89)***  0.941  (8.17)***  0.943  (6.16)***
GP2 1.000  (0.09)+  1.000  (0.09)+  1.000  (0.02)+
GS 0.951  (4.57)***  0.933  (4.57)***  0.935  (3.86)***
GS2 1.001  (0.82)+  1.000  (0.19)+  1.000  (0.15)+
YCA 0.997  (0.46)+  0.986  (1.46)+  0.990  (0.89)+
RCA 0.947  (1.26)+  0.959  (0.77)+  0.946  (0.86)+
 Position  Dummies 
GK  ref. cat.  ref. cat.  ref. cat.
DEF 1.091  (2.16)**  1.407  (6.62)***  1.213  (3.05)***
MID 1.164  (3.72)***  1.504  (7.73)***  1.306  (4.16)***
FOR 1.362  (7.52)***  1.848  (11.56)***  1.562  (6.91)***
  Region of Origin Dummies
GER  ref. cat.  ref. cat.  ref. cat.
EEU 1.086  (1.81)*  1.234  (3.71)***  1.203  (3.29)***
WEU 1.098  (2.33)**  1.263  (4.48)***  1.229  (4.19)***
NAM 1.214  (1.13)+  1.370  (1.12)+  1.402  (1.16)+
SAM 1.047  (0.78)+  1.197  (2.25)**  1.205  (2.51)**
ASI 0.856  (1.46)+  0.990  (0.08)+  0.927  (0.69)+
AFR 1.062  (1.12)+  1.130  (1.77)*  1.140  (1.94)*
AUS 0.782  (1.24)+  0.883  (0.54)+  0.853  (0.68)+
 Institutional  Characteristics
NC16 0.769  (4.25)***  0.806  (3.09)***  0.739  (4.38)***
NC18  ref. cat.  ref. cat.  ref. cat.
NC20 1.066  (1.07)+  0.917  (1.08)+  0.984  (0.19)+
FOR3 0.961  (1.08)+  0.752  (5.75)***  0.835  (3.38)***
FOR+ 0.803  (6.71)***  0.768  (6.58)***  0.738  (6.86)***
POS 1.097  (32.14)***  1.085  (24.02)***  1.085  (22.27)***
Observations 15299  15299  9392
No. of Failures  4900  3662  3662
LL Null model  -38295.38  -27445.33  -20177.21
LL Full model  -36879.20  -25893.10  -19199.03
Wald Chi2  5314.43  5536.00  3528.65
# Standard errors adjusted for clustering on teams
Global test of proportional hazards assumption: 61.33 (Model I); 48.22 (Model II); 52.32 (Model III); none 
of them statistically signiﬁ  cant.
+ not signiﬁ  cant; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Whether players from speciﬁ  c areas of the world are discriminated against with 
regard to the duration of their individual careers can be seen from the coefﬁ  cients of 
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cant coefﬁ  cients for Eastern Europeans, Western Europeans and South Americans 
indicate that players from these regions face a higher risk of being eliminated from the 
Bundesliga. This, however, is certainly not necessarily indicative of discrimination in 
the sense that either managers or spectators prefer players of German origin. Rather, 
especially players from Western Europe and South America may leave the Bundesliga 
because they sign more lucrative contracts with teams in Spain, Italy, England and 
France. This explanation, however, does not apply in the case of players from Eastern 
Europe, who may indeed suffer from discrimination. Kalter [1999], for example, has 
recently shown that the number of replica shirts sold is signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uenced by the 
players’ origin: While shirts with the names of players from Eastern Europe do not 
sell well, those with the names of South American players are bestsellers. Moreover, 
the poorer the performance of the team (in terms of league position at the end of the 
season), the higher the individual player’s risk of termination (an increase in the ﬁ  nal 
position by one rank increases the probability of being cut by almost 10%).7
Most revealing are the coefﬁ  cients of the variables indicating changes in the in-
stitutional environment. When looking at the impact of the Bosman-ruling and the 
ensuing further liberalization of the player market on individual careers, we ﬁ  nd that 
the respective coefﬁ  cients are negatively signed (the hazard ratios are smaller than 
one) and highly signiﬁ  cant, indicating that a “liberalized” player market does not 
reduce, but rather increases the career durations of Bundesliga players. Given the 
inﬂ  ux of cheap labor especially from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia this is a surpris-
ing ﬁ  nding. A possible explanation for this observation might be that the additional 
labor supply deters shirking behavior within the incumbent work    force.8
Estimating the three models presented in Table 5 with team dummies gives interest-
ing results, too (see Table 6): First, the Cox model is again to be preferred to its alterna-
tives (various parametric models), implying that the proportional hazard assumption is 
supported by the data. Second, the coefﬁ  cients of the individual player characteristics 
remain virtually unchanged (the detailed results are available upon request).
Finally, and most interestingly, the team dummies themselves indicate that even 
after controlling for the performance of the team it does make a difference for the 
players for which club they are playing in terms of the duration of their careers: In 
many cases players who were active for a team that was relegated at the end of the 
season are not able to sign with another ﬁ  rst division club and are, therefore, very 
likely to disappear in the 2nd or even 3rd division (such as 1. FC Saarbruecken, Borussia 
Neunkirchen, Preussen Muenster, Fortuna Koeln, SSV Ulm, Darmstadt 98, Stutt-
garter Kickers, Tennis Borussia Berlin and VfB Leipzig). On the other hand, there 
are a number of notable exceptions, i.e., teams whose players have a high chance of 
being rehired by other ﬁ  rst division teams in the case of relegation. Among them are 
clubs like Dynamo Dresden, Hansa Rostock, Energie Cottbus, SG Wattenscheid 09, 
Waldhof Mannheim and VfL Bochum.9 Many of these players managed to stay in the 
league even in case their former team got relegated.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While the ﬁ  ndings presented above are conclusive, the potential of our data is by 
no means exhausted yet. For the 1990s we have additional information on player sala-438 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  6
  The Impact of Individual Teams on the Duration of Player Careers
Team  Spell Duration  Career Duration  Career Duration 
  (Model I)  (Model II)  (Model III)
 Hazard  z  Hazard  z  Hazard  z
 Ratio    Ratio    Ratio 
1. FC Dynamo Dresden  0.710  (2.80)***  0.892  (0.76)+  0.710  (2.13)**
1. FC Kaiserslautern  0.916  (1.20)+  0.917  (1.01)+  0.819  (2.27)**
1. FC Köln  1.159  (2.12)**  1.171  (1.88)*  1.093  (1.03)+
1. FC Nürnberg  0.915  (1.18)+  0.945  (0.63)+  0.917  (0.92)+
1. FC Saarbrücken  1.392  (3.88)***  1.532  (3.92)***  1.445  (3.03)***
Alemannia  Aachen  1.090 (0.83)+  1.280 (1.98)**  1.052 (0.43)+
Arminia  Bielefeld  1.086 (1.09)+  0.988 (0.12)+  0.920 (0.75)+
Borussia  Dortmund  0.975 (0.35)+  0.960 (0.47)+  0.961 (0.44)+
Bayer 04 Leverkusen  0.800  (2.44)**  0.717  (3.00)***  0.660  (3.40)***
Blau-Weiß 90 Berlin  1.346  (2.06)**  1.386  (1.55)+  1.008  (0.04)+
Bor.  Mönchengladbach  0.921 (1.04)+  0.907 (1.05)+  0.874 (1.34)+
Borussia  Neunkirchen  1.409 (3.44)***  1.428 (2.77)*** 1.247 (1.54)+
Eintracht  Frankfurt  1.005 (0.08)+  1.039 (0.49)+  0.996 (0.05)+
FC 08 Homburg  0.990  (0.09)+  1.082  (0.54)+  0.936  (0.33)+
FC Bayern München  1.366  (4.02)***  1.234  (2.24)**  1.157  (1.57)+
FC Energie Cottbus  0.359  (4.15)***  0.415  (3.47)***  0.387  (3.59)***
FC Hansa Rostock  0.815  (1.95)*  0.852  (1.26)+  0.773  (1.80)*
FC Schalke 04  0.892  (1.62)+  0.901  (1.20)+  0.832  (2.01)**
FC St. Pauli Hamburg  1.078  (0.91)+  1.120  (1.13)+  1.094  (0.83)+
Fortuna  Düsseldorf  0.953 (0.65)+  1.015 (0.16)+  0.930 (0.74)+
Hamburger SV  ref. team  ref. team  ref. team
Hannoverscher SV 96  1.021  (0.26)+  0.940  (0.66)+  0.828  (1.85)*
Hertha BSC Berlin  1.171  (2.10)**  1.208  (2.10)**  1.120  (1.22)+
KFC Uerdingen 05  1.048  (0.64)+  1.000  (0.00)+  0.900  (1.06)+
Karlsruher  SC  0.949 (0.77)+  1.027 (0.32)+  0.922 (0.96)+
Kickers  Offenbach  1.389 (3.45)***  1.075 (0.55)+  0.970 (0.22)+
MSV  Duisburg  1.049 (0.66)+  1.113 (1.30)+  0.960 (0.46)+
Preußen  Münster  2.519 (4.99)***  2.381 (3.45)*** 2.379 (3.52)***
Rot-Weiß  Essen  1.123 (1.38)+  1.019 (0.16)+  1.024 (0.21)+
Rot-Weiß  Oberhausen 0.822 (1.88)*  0.993 (0.06)+  0.851 (1.23)+
SC Fortuna Köln  2.266  (5.99)***  2.889  (6.44)***  2.273  (4.54)***
SC  Freiburg  0.957 (0.47)+  1.103 (0.83)+  1.027 (0.21)+
SG Wattenscheid 09  0.741  (2.71)***  0.963  (0.26)+  0.742  (2.17)**
SSV Ulm 1846  2.110  (5.62)***  2.810  (6.18)***  2.050  (4.19)***
SV Darmstadt 98  1.569  (3.24)***  1.580  (2.59)***  1.201  (0.75)+
SV Waldhof Mannheim  0.795  (2.42)**  0.801  (1.73)*  0.700  (2.84)***
SV Werder Bremen  0.884  (1.70)*  0.849  (1.93)*  0.771  (2.97)***
SpVgg  Unterhaching  1.301 (1.92)*  1.483 (2.35)**  1.348 (1.53)+
Stuttgarter  Kickers  1.404 (2.85)***  1.649 (3.57)*** 1.480 (2.15)**
TSV 1860 München  1.026  (0.33)+  0.999  (0.01)+  0.968  (0.34)+
Eintracht  Braunschweig  0.898 (1.31)+  0.889 (1.18)+  0.809 (1.93)*
Tasmania 1900 Berlin  1.133  (1.17)+  1.466  (2.72)***  1.155  (1.09)+
Tennis Borussia Berlin  1.484  (3.55)***  1.201  (0.95)+  1.542  (2.65)***
VfB  Leipzig  1.353 (2.16)**  1.587 (2.28)**  1.329 (1.64)+
VfB  Stuttgart  0.992 (0.11)+  0.999 (0.01)+  0.882 (1.39)+
VfL  Bochum  0.857 (2.15)**  0.776 (2.88)*** 0.750 (3.05)***
VfL  Wolfsburg  1.041 (0.30)+  1.206 (1.30)+  1.076 (0.47)+
Wuppertaler  SV  1.004 (0.03)+  1.177 (1.20)+  1.018 (0.11)+
+ not signiﬁ  cant; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01439 CAREER DURATION IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
ries, contract duration and more detailed performance statistics (such as international 
caps10). Moreover, we have complete information on transfer fees11 that have been paid 
since 1981/82 by the Bundes  liga teams. Although that information is available only 
for a subperiod it will enable us to control for additional (potential) determinants of 
career duration in a risky environment. Moreover, it is certainly advisable to repeat 
the estimates for subperiods, such as 1963-1970; 1971-1980; 1981-1990 and 1991-
2000) in order to check for the stability of the point estimates over time. Finally, we 
will certainly try to estimate a competing risk model that takes into consideration 
the different reasons for leaving the Bun  des  liga (voluntary vs. involun  tary exit, for 
an application see, inter alia, Dolton and van der Klaauw [1999]).
Moreover, the ﬁ  nding that teams may discriminate against players from Eastern 
Europe should be subject to further research. The most pertinent question in this con-
text is whether teams pay a penalty for their management’s or their supporters’ taste 
for discrimination (for empirical evidence on this point see, for example, Szymanski 
[2000]). Another promising direction for further research is estimating a time-series 
model (see Schmidt and Berri [2002]) that allows identifying the impact of changes 
in the institutional environment on average career duration. 
In principle the data allows testing Rottenberg’s [1956] invariance hypothesis as 
well as Daly and Moore’s [1981] transactions cost approach. In case the invariance 
hypothesis holds we should observe that player mobility is unaffected by changes in 
the legal environment, such as the “Bosman ruling” of the European Court of Justice 
in December 1995. If, however, transactions costs are reduced by restricting player 
mobility, then “excess mobility” detrimental to the value of the league may be the 
consequence of such a “liberal” regime.12
 APPENDIX
 FIGURE  1
  Labor Market Dynamics in the German Bundesliga (1963/64-2002/03)
 












ﬁ  rst line: all players  second line: stayer (players remaining with their team)
third line: entrants (new players)  fourth line: drop-outs (players leaving Bundesliga)
ﬁ  fth line: mover (players changing teams within Bundesliga)440 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 FIGURE  2
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  A: Start of observation period (season 1963/64)
         B: End of observation period (season 2002/03)
         t1: Completed Spell
        t2, t3: Intermediate exit with subsequent reentry
        t4: Right-censored spell (no information on players after 2002/2003
       t5: Left-censored spell (no information on players before 1963/64)
 FIGURE  3
  Survivor Rate of Professional Soccer Players in the 
  German Bundesliga, 1963/64-2002/03
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 FIGURE  4
  Hazard Rate of Professional Soccer Players in the 
  German Bundesliga, 1963/64-2002/03
 












1.   See, for example, Franck [1995]; Erning [2000]; Kipker [2001]; Swieter [2002]; Ziebs [2002] and Klaffke 
[2003].
2.   “Relegation” in the German context means that at the end of each season the three weakest teams 
are demoted to the second division and replaced by the three best-performing teams from that second 
division. For an economic analysis of the promotion and relegation system in the English football 
league,  see Noll [2002].
3.   Figure 1 in the appendix displays the annual number of stayer, mover, entrants and dropouts. 
4.   We also added a linear time trend to our estimations. The coefﬁ  cient was insigniﬁ  cant in all speciﬁ  ca-
tions, leaving the other variables unaffected (this is probably due to multicollinearity). The results of 
these extended estimations are available upon request.
5.   Goals are not only scored by forwards, but also by defenders and midﬁ  elders (some of the latter are 
quite “offensive”). Moreover, some goalkeepers take virtually every penalty kick for their team and 
are, therefore, also scoring goals. Interacting the number of goals scored with the position dummies 
leaves the basic ﬁ  ndings virtually unaffected.
6.   This may be due to the fact that the performance of forwards is relatively easy to measure, i.e., “number 
of goals scored” is an obvious metric while “number of tackles won” as the main performance measure 
for defenders is certainly more difﬁ  cult to quantify. 
7.   Additional measures, such as the number of tickets sold per season or capacity utilization of the 
stadium, proved to be insigniﬁ  cant.
8.   Feess, Frick and Muehlheusser [2004] ﬁ  nd that shirking is quite prevalent in German soccer, because 
player performance seems to improve as players reach the end of their contracts.
9.  It may well be that these clubs have a particularly well developed youth training and scouting system, 
producing players who can succeed almost everywhere.
10.   This term denotes a player’s appearances in his home country’s national team.
11.   By that we mean the amount of money that is being paid to a team that “sells” a player to another 
club before that player’s contract has expired.
12.   We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing this out.442 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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